Narcos are neither pure criminals or pure terrorists. The optimal approach recognizes this and does not apply the wrong paradigm to fight them.

Start with the fact that cartels are not traditional organized crime organizations that U.S. law enforcement is familiar with. Mafias do not have safe haven, but cartels control substantial territory. In this way, they resemble state actors more than they do criminal gangs. The analogy is easier to draw to ISIS in 2015 than La Cosa Nostra in 1950.

But appearances can be deceiving. Terrorists are zealots—narcos are businessmen. With cartels, violence is ancillary to profit. They fight in order to control. The level of violence may resemble terrorism. But the purpose of a narco’s violence and a terrorist’s violence is fundamentally different. Terrorists kill to provoke—to create a psychological effect. Narcos kill for control.

For a terrorist, violence is designed to produce political change. The more graphic and dramatic the killing the better; greater violence sows greater terror and produced greater likelihood of political change.

Cartels don’t have such straightforward a calculus. Their optimal environment is one of stability, in which they are able to operate discretely. If a cartel has sufficient control, there is no need for violence. And indeed, violence in that situation is counterproductive. It serves to disrupt the stability that supports business operations. And in the end, these are businesses. Their goal is profit, not politics. Violent contests for control are a distraction from the core operations that help them achieve their goal.

So, an optimal response to the cartels recognizes this distinction in motives. Violence is not as core to the operations of cartels as it is to terrorists. Even the most violent cartels prove this conclusion.

The Zetas Cartel came to dominate much of Northern Mexico in 2011 because they generated notoriety with their gratuitous violence. They exterminated the 300-person town of Allende, 40 minutes west of the Texas city of Eagle Pass, over the course of three days simply because they suspected an informant. Their leader personally killed over 2,000 people. His preferred method: stuff his victim into an oil barrel and set her on fire.

But the Zeta’s tremendous violence was not an end of itself. The Zetas prosecuted this campaign in order to gain control. They only achieved their organizational goals once they had control and began their trafficking operations.

CJNG complements this by promoting a militaristic image. It repeatedly posts photos and videos of their sicarios in military uniform with armored vehicles and heavy firepower. See below. When a Mexican citizen in Jalisco sees that image of professionalism and contrasts it with the experiences they’ve had with their local police, it is no wonder that CJNG is able to exert so much control.

Sadly, CJNG even takes concrete steps to bolster their professional image and undercut faith in the Mexican government. In 2015, it successfully repelled an attempt by the Mexican federal government to arrest its leader, El Mencho. CJNG demonstrated its ability to standup to anything the government could throw at it. At one point, it successfully shot down a military helicopter.

But even in this most militaristic action, CJNG was resorting to violence to maintain the status quo. They were preventing El Mencho’s capture. Terrorists want things to change; CJNG and other cartels often want them to stay the same. If they do seek change, it is only until they achieve control.

This reveals that it is the instrumentality of violence that differs between cartels and terrorists. We are often quick to disregard this conclusion because the violence of cartels is both prolific and horrific. It grabs our attention and thus the focus of our analysis. But we should not forget that this violence is the goal of a terrorist while it is only the tool of a narco.

What does this mean for how we treat cartels versus terrorist groups? What different tact that does this lead us to when fighting CJNG instead of Al Qaeda? There are two key implications: Fight the business and fight the corruption.