575,000 

The number of Mexicans confirmed dead or missing since the start of the Narco War in 2006.

646,600

The number of American combat deaths during all wars in U.S. history combined.

On February 20, 2025, the U.S. State Department formally designated five Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Procedurally, this was a simple step: Pursuant to the governing statute, the Secretary of State can unilaterally apply this classification if he finds that an organization is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” (loosely defined to include using a firearm to “endanger” a person), and threatens American security.

This procedurally simple step has profound consequences. It unlocks a bevy of statutory authorities that Congress provided to domestic law enforcement agencies following 9/11. This article surveys a handful of the most significant authorities. Those include high-powered surveillance tools and crushing criminal penalties.

More subtly, but perhaps more importantly, this procedural step announces a major conceptual shift in how the United States treats Mexican cartels. Put simply, the war on drugs is set to look a lot more like the war on terror.

This project examines the consequences of treating these organizations like terrorist groups. While there are similarities between narcos and terrorists, there are also important differences. These differences may render counterterrorism tools inappropriate, ineffective, and even dangerous to civil liberties and the rule of law.

As the FTO designation reflects, the cartel threat is indeed a serious one. Over the past 40 years, these organizations have woven themselves deep into the fabric of the United States’ biggest neighbor. They actively control almost 40% of Mexico’s land and spend over $1 billion annually to bribe its public officials. With gratuitous violence, they compete with each other for the lucrative right to flood the United States with narcotics that have led to thousands of American deaths. South of the border, this contest has led to the death and disappearance of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans. It is well past time for the United States to do more to fight the groups that terrorize its southern neighbor. But falling into the trap of viewing them as terrorists may not be the answer.

How We Arrived

Part I examines the previous status quo. It briefly describes how we got here. It provides an account of how modern Mexican drug cartels became a serious threat to international security. It also briefly surveys the five groups that the Trump Administration designated as FTOs.

Where We Are

Part II discusses the brave new world of today’s counter-cartel efforts. It surveys the suit of new national security tools that U.S. investigators and prosecutors have to fight these mobs following their designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also describes how these tools—and the underlying decision to treat cartels like terrorist groups—may rely on a mistaken model of how.

Where We Should Go Now

Part III suggests a third path. If a law-enforcement approach failed and a terrorism model is inappropriate, what policy should the United States pursue? This Part suggests the United States recognize the cartels as a threat distinct from both terrorist groups and organized crime. Based on this recognize, the United States should focus its efforts on (1) fighting the business of the cartels and  (2) helping the Mexican government root out the corruption that supports them.

Tan Lejos de Dios y Tan Cerca de Estados Unidos

Concluding Thoughts

Cormac McCarthy dedicated a trilogy of his twelve novels to stories of Mexico. The climax of the trilogy pits a man from West Texas—who spent years as a ranch hand in Mexico—against a murderous Mexican pimp. In response to the latter’s insults of the Texan’s foreignness, the Texan says, “I know this country too.” The Mexican responds, “No one knows this country.”

Mexico is beautiful and tragic, with a long history of violence. Yes, the cartels are a grave, dangerous problem. But American insistence that we meet their violence with greater violence will only lead to more pain for a people who’ve already endured more than modern Americans can comprehend. And as we learned through previous American expeditions, the strategy may not yield lasting results.

Porfirio Díaz, the brutal dictator who ruled Mexico for decades before the Mexican Revolution, once said, “Pobre México, tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de Estados Unidos”—“Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States.”  

Maybe Díaz was being unfair to the United States when he said this. Mexican proximity to the most prosperous consumer market in the world has helped lift millions of Mexicans from poverty. But in many ways, he was right. The United States has for nearly a century demanded illicit drugs from Mexico. In return, the United States has given only apathy and guns. The former gave the cartels the space to grow. The latter: the ability to kill hundreds of thousands while doing so. When it comes to the cartels, the United States has been complicit in cause and complacent in effect. This is among America’s greatest sins.

McCarthy—at least writing as an American—was right to say that Mexico cannot be fully understood. But even if Americans can't know Mexico, we haven't lost our ability to know right and wrong.

The fight against the cartels deserves our attention, not our drone strikes. Terrorism surveillance authorities and criminal statutes offer new opportunities to fight the cartel threat. But only if we employ them wisely. The United States must recognize the cartels not as terrorists or as traditional organized-crime groups, but as a unique threat that deserves a unique solution. That solution requires us to fight the cartels like the businesses they are. Perhaps more importantly, it requires that the United States help the Mexican government root out insidious corruption. This will ensure the fight continues when the American attention of the current moment inevitably moves on.

The cartels rightly deserve American attention. But perhaps even more so, Mexico needs American help.